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THE BURGER COURT'S "NEwEST" EQUAL PROTECTION: IRREBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION DOCTRINE REJECTEI---Two-TIER REVIEW REINSTATED
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976)
In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,1 the Supreme Court
signalled an end to the irrebuttable presumption doctrine2 and
demonstrated that it will not, even given a clear opportunity, expand the
categories of fundamental interest or suspect classification. Massachu-
setts has a mandatory retirement statute requiring state police officers to
retire at age fifty.' Lieutenant Colonel Murgia, a fifty-year old officer
with twenty-four years service in the Uniformed Branch of the Massa-
1. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
2. See Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per
curiam). In this case the Court nullified a Utah statute which made pregnant women
ineligible for employment compensation benefits for a period extending from twelve
weeks before the expected birth to six weeks after childbirth. The Court cited as
controlling precedent Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S, 632 (1974), in which
the fundamental interest of privacy in matters of marriage and procreation was involved.
See generally Bezanson, Some Thoughts on Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine,
7 IND. L. REV. 644 (1974); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1534 (1974); Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine:
Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 800 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable
Presumption: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975); 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV.
565; 89 HARV. L. REV. 77 (1975); 58 MINN. L. REV. 965 (1974).
3. See generally Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A
more Modest Role For Equal Protection, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 89; Canby, Burger Court
and the Validity of Classifications in Social Legislation: Currents of Federalism, 1975
AnPxz. ST. L.I 1; Dixon, The Supreme Court and Equality: The Most Elusive Value,
forthcoming in CORNELL L. REV. (1977); Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1972); 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 839 (1975).
4. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 32, § 26(3)(a) (West 1966) provides:
(a) Any . . . officer appointed under section nine A of chapter twenty-two
. . . who has performed service in the division of state police in the department
of public safety for not less than twenty years, shall be retired by the state
board of retirement upon his attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such
twenty years, whichever last occurs.
(b) Any . . . officer . . . who has performed service . . . for not less than
twenty years and who has not attained . . . age fifty in the case of an officer
appoInted under the said section nine A, shall be retired by the state board of
retirement in case the rating board, after an examination of such officer or in-
spector by a registered physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the
state board of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for
the performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be permanent.
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chusetts State Police brought suit to challenge the constitutionality of the
statute, arguing that it violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. A mandatory physical examination four months
prior to his fiftieth birthday confirmed petitioner's excellent physical and
mental health so that the state did not dispute his ability to perform the
duties of a uniformed police officer. A three judge district court
concluded that the statute was not rationally related to any substantial
state interest and was therefore an unconstitutional violation of the equal
protection clause.5 The United States Supreme Court reversed, and
held: The appropriate equal protection standard for determining the
constitutionality of a statute that neither disadvantages any suspect
class nor infringes upon any fundamental interest is the traditional mere
rationality test. Accordingly, the Massachusetts retirement statute is
constitutional since it is not wholly arbitrary or irrationally related to the
legitimate state purpose of ensuring a vigorous police force.
The fourteenth amendment provides that "[n1o state shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."6
Originally, the Supreme Court held that this clause permitted statutory
classification systems that were rationally related to the legislative pur-
pose of the statute and treated equally everyone within the classifica-
tion.7 Courts would employ a more stringent test only when a statute
used race as a classification factor.8
The Warren Court developed a two-tier analysis of challenged stat-
utes, in which the strictness of review depended upon the classification
created and the individual interest affected.9 The Court would apply
5. Murgia v. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass. 1974),
icv'd, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Kotch v. Board of
River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61 (1911).
8. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting stricter review might be required
w here statute infringes upon a right guaranteed by one of the first ten amendments);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
9. Compare McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), and
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), with Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972), and Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), and Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966). See generally Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Re-
turn of the Natural Law-Due Process Formula, 16 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 716 (1969);
Yackle, Thoughts on Rodriguez: Mr. Justice Powell and the Demise of Equal Protec-
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the traditional mere rationality test to most statutory classifications,
inquiring whether "any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify"'0 the legislation. This test presumed the statute to be valid, and
under it the Court upheld almost every classification scheme as not
entirely arbitrary or irrational." Statutory classifications that discrimi-
nated against classes the Court found to be peculiarly burdened, and
therefore entitled to special protection,' 2 and classifications that in-
fringed upon the exercise of fundamental interests guaranteed by the
Constitution 8 triggered a higher level of judicial review, known as strict
lion Analysis in the Supreme Court, 9 U. RICH. L. REv. 181 (1975); Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rnv. 1065 (1969).
10. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
11. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (overruling Morey v. Doud,
354 U.S. 457 (1957), the only decision in which the Court held a piece of economic
legislation unconstitutional under the mere rationality test); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McDonald v.
Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961).
12. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
(characteristics of a suspect class include a history of prejudice and unequal treatment
along with a position of political powerlessness requiring great protection by the
majoritarian political process); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938) ("discrete and insular" minorities require heightened judicial solicitude).
The Court has held classifications based on race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); alienage, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); nationality, Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); and arguably illegitimacy, Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628 (1974), to be suspect and have closely scrutinized them. See generally
Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless Minorities, 59 IowA L. REV. 1059 (1974).
13. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Warren Court introduced the
idea that classifications that impinged upon the exercise of fundamental interests
guaranteed by the Constitution were subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 634-35. But, such
an idea was not entirely new. During the first third of the twentieth century the Court
had employed a substantive due process analysis in which it inquired whether the subject
or purpose of the challenged legislation, not simply the classification chosen to accom-
plish the purpose, too greatly infringed upon the free exercise of an individual's
fundamental interests. If the Court concluded that the infringement was too great, it
struck down the statute, thereby precluding any further legislative action in that area. In
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), the Court denounced this period of
"Lochnerizing," a term derived from the first case explicitly employing this analysis,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), on the grounds that the Lochner Court had
used the slippery, elusive "fundamental interest" concept to strike down legislation it
believed unwise or unjust. On a few occasions following Nebbia, the Court grounded its
holding on substantive due process. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). By
the mid-1960s the Court once again found certain social and economic legislation
reprehensible as in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one year residency
requirement for welfare payment eligibility), and sought a way to strike down the
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scrutiny.14 Absent a showing by the state of a compelling purpose
requiring the classification, the Court would find the statute unconstitu-
tional.Y5 Rarely did a statute survive this higher level of review.16
Consequently, the level of review employed by the Court was often
determinative of the outcome of an equal protection case.
In several decisions beginning with Shapiro v. Thompson," the Court
attempted to find an intermediate level of review that would overcome
the rigidity of the two-tier approach.' It expanded the definitions of
fundamental interest and suspect class,' and gradually2 ° employed the
legislation. Because the Court had earlier repudiated substantive due process analysis,
the Warren Court seized upon the equal protection clause and required strict scrutiny of
statutory classifications which infringed upon fundamental interests. See sources cited
note 9 supra; Barrett, supra note 3; Canby, supra note 3; Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. Rpv. 197 (1976); Strong, The Economic Philosophy of
Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure, and Emasculation, 15 Aiuz. L. Ruv. 419 (1973).
14. Interests which the Court has held to be fundamental include the right to
procreate, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); the right to vote, Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 33 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); the right to travel, Dunn; Shiapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and, possibly some aspects of personal privacy,
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See
Goodpaster, The Constitutional and Fundamental Rights, 14 ARM L. Rav. 480 (1973).
15. See cases cited notes 12 & 14 supra.
16. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting): "To challenge such lines by the 'compelling state interest' standard is to
condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly
insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing less than
perfection." But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race classifica-
tion upheld because necessary for national security during World War II); Crane v. New
York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) (restriction on employment of aliens upheld as necessary for
welfare of unemployed United States citizens). Recently, several cases involving minor
inhibitions on fundamental interests, such as petition requirements, have survived the
compelling state interest-strict scrutiny requirement. American Party v. White, 415 U.S.
767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431
(1971). See 53 N.C.L. REv. 430 (1974).
17. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
18. See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1969).
19. See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1971) (In an action concerning Oregon's Forcible Entry and
Wrongful Detainer Statute, the majority rejected appellant's argument that the "need for
decent shelter" and "right to retain peaceful possession of one's home" are fundamental
interests, but Justice Douglas in dissent readily accepted this argument.); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 529 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting):
In any event, it cannot suffice merely to invoke the spectre of the past and
to recite from Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. and Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co. to decide the case. Appellees are not a gas company or an opticalhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss1/12
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flexible sliding-scale review advocated by Justice Marshall. This analy-
sis meant that the degree of scrutiny would vary depending on four
factors: (1) the nexus between the interest infringed by the statutory
classification and a right guaranteed by the Constitution; (2) the degree
of suspectuess of the classification; (3) the state purpose to be accom-
plished by the statute; and, (4) the means employed by the statute to
achieve its purpose. 21 If the interest were closely related to the exercise
of a right expressly stated or implied in the Constitution, the Court
would rigorously examine the legislation.22 For example, the right to
vote is not guaranteed by the Constitution, but is closely related to the
exercise of the first amendment right to freedom of speech. Therefore,
dispenser; they are needy dependent children and families who are discrimi-
nated against by the State.
See also Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 83 HAv. L. REa. 7 (1969) (suggests that the Court was utilizing the equal
protection clause, perhaps without realizing it, as a means of guaranteeing acquisition of
the basic necessities of life to all).
20. For a short time after Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court
explained what interests and classes warranted greater protection and why. See Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S.
621 (1969).
21. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109, 124-25
(Marshall, J., dissenting):
In summary, it seems to me inescapably clear that this Court has consistently
adjusted the care with which it will review state discrimination in light of the
constitutional significance of the interests affected and the invidiousness of the
particular classification. In the context of economic interests, we find discrim-
inatory state action is almost always sustained, for such interests are gener-
ally far removed from constitutional guarantees. . . . But the situation differs
markedly when discrimination against important individual interests with
constitutional implications and against particularly disadvantaged or powerless
classes is involved ....
The nature of our inquiry into the justifications for state discrimination is
essentially the same in all equal protection cases: we must consider the sub-
stantiality of the state interests sought to be served, and we must scrutinize the
reasonableness of the means by which the state has sought to advance its inter-
ests. Differences in the application of this test are, in my view, a function
of the constitutional importance of the interests at stake and the invidiousness
of the particular classification .
See generally Barrett, supra note 3; Dixon, supra note 3; Gunther, supra note 3; Canby,
supra note 3 (articles suggesting various terms to describe this new level of review by
the Court, including middle level review, equal protection with bite, strong rational basis
test, and active rational basis test).
22. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Justice Marshall in dissent noted that the equal protection clause was meaningless if it
only protected rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution from state
impingement because these rights already required strict scrutiny against any state
infringement. Id. at 100.
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the Court would closely scrutinize legislation infringing on the right to
vote to decide whether the state's interest in the classification scheme
was sufficient to warrant the infringement.2" Alternatively, if the classi-
fication were "almost" suspect, 24 the Court would require the state to
show that its choice of means or its classification scheme was justified by
a "pressing" need before upholding the statute.2"
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 2 the Court
signalled an end to the sliding-scale analysis2 7 it had liberally applied
since 1971.28 Plaintiff in Rodriguez asserted a right to an equal
education for all, arguably as fundamental to the exercise of first
amendment rights as voting.-9  The Court nonetheless rejected this
theory,"' finding no "really" fundamental interest or suspect class, 31 and
23. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399
U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
24. That is, if the classification only had some of the characteristics of suspectness
defined by the Court. For example, the classes of illegitimates, the female sex, and the
aged have many of the indicia of suspectness but have not as yet been explicitly
recognized as suspect by the Court.
25. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 465-72 (1972) (dissent convincingly
pointed out that although the Court claimed to be employing a mere rationality test, it
in fact v.as requiring the state to chow a strong interest similar to that in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where an acknowledged fundamental interest was
involved). See also Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); United
States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Both Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443 (5th
Cir. 1973), and Murgia v. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753 (D.
Mass. 1974), rev'd, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), cited Reed, which is perhaps the best exam-
ple of a sliding-scale analysis requirimg the state to show a substantial reason for
employing the specific means at issue, and engaged in a similar analysis.
26. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
27. Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Rodriguez, held that the right to an
education was not a fundamental interest and wealth was not a suspect class. He
refused to apply a varying level of review, noting that while "some identifiable quantum
of education (may be] a Constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful
exercise" of the right to free speech or to vote, a state school financing statute which
resulted in unequal expenditures between districts did not infringe upon any important
interest, nor invidiously discriminate against a suspect class and was therefore subject
only to a traditional mere rationality test. Id. at 36.
28. See cases cited notes 23 & 25 supra.
29. Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), with Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969), and Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
30. See Justice Powell's majority opinion, 411 U.S. at 31 (quoting Shapiro v.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss1/12
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noting the delicate questions of local autonomy and federalism 3 2 in-
volved in striking down these statutes. Consequently, it applied the
mere rationality test to uphold the local property tax system of financing
public education.33
Having noted the deficiencies of the sliding-scale analysis in Rodri-
guez, the Burger Court continued its search for an intermediate level of
statutory review34 by relying on earlier decisions8" applying a doctrine of
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969): "The Court today does not 'pick out particular
human activities, characterize them as 'fundamental,' and give them added protection
.' To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established
constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself
demands.").
31. 411 U.S. at28-29, 36-39.
32. Justice Powell noted:
The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied
too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innovative
new thinking as to public education, its methods and its funding is necessary
to assure both a higher level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity.
. . . But the ultimate solutions must come from the law-makers and from the
democratic pressures of those who elect them. Id. at 58.
See Canby, supra note 3 (suggesting considerations of federalism represent a large factor
in the Court's decision whether to apply a close scrutiny or a mere rationality test).
33. 411 U.S. at 56-59.
34. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States
Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441
(1973). See generally sources cited note 2 supra.
35. See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932). In the 1920s and 1930s the Court
used the irrebuttable presumption doctrine to strike down classifications in the tax law.
Because of its similarity to substantive due process analysis, however, it was sharply
criticized for the same reasons that "Lochnerizing" was denounced. It lay almost unused
until 1965 when it was employed to invalidate statutory classification schemes. Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
In Bell, the Court relied on procedural due process to strike down a statute that
required suspension of the motor vehicle registration and driver's license of an uninsured
motorist involved in an accident unless he posted security to cover the amount of
damages claimed by the aggrieved party. While the Court could have employed the
sliding-scale analysis under the equal protection clause to find that the removal of a
license under these circumstances infringed upon the individual's right to a livelihood, it
would have opened itself to attack for expanding the fundamental interest doctrine.
Instead, the Court seized upon the irrebuttable presumption created by the statute and
upon the license itself, calling it an entitlement or property interest, and held that the
removal of such an "important interest of the licensee" by an irrebuttable presumption
was forbidden without the procedural due process protection of a hearing to determine
whether the motorist was at fault. 402 U.S. at 539. Thus, the Court was able to strike
down a piece of legislation that infringed upon a person's ability to pursue a livelihood-
an interest which the majority opinion indicated was fundamental-without having to
Washington University Open Scholarship
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irrebuttable presumption. 6 Without specifying whether any fundamen-
tal interest or suspect class warranted close scrutiny,3 7 the Court struck
down several statutes containing presumptions that were "not necessarily
or universally true in fact. '3 8 In practice, the Court applied this poten-
tially limitless doctrine to invalidate only those statutes that infringed on
a fairly fundamental interes 9 or discriminated against a fairly suspect
class.4
Thus, irrebuttable presumption analysis became the equivalent of
Justice Marshall's sliding scale4' with less predictable results. Employ-
ing this method, the Court could decide that the state interest was
insufficiently compelling to justify the use of an irrebuttable presump-
tion in a statutory scheme and hold that due process required individual
hearings to allow a person to rebut the presumption, as it did in Vlandis
defend the expansion of the fundamental interest definition. See generally sources cited
note 2 supra.
36. A statute which provides that if Fact A is present, Fact B is presumed to be
present, contains an irrebuttable presumption.
37. Compare Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (right to
procreate), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (right to raise one's children),
and Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (right to earn a living), and Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (right to vote), with the unstated interests involved in United
States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), and Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441 (1973). See Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 460 (Burger, C.J., dissenting): "Distress-
ingly, the Court applies 'strict scrutiny' and invalidates Connecticut's statutory scheme
without explaining why the statute impairs a genuine constitutional interest truly worthy
of the standard of close judicial scrutiny."
38. The Court held in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973), that if the
presumed fact is "not necessarily or universally true in fact and ... the State has
reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination," the statute unconsti-
tutionally violates the due process clause.
39. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (right to
procreate); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (right to rear one's children); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (right to earn a livelihood); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89 (1965) (right to vote).
40. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (sex as a suspect
class); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (wealth as a
suspect class); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (sex as a suspect class).
41. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651-57 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring on equal protection grounds); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 529-38 (1973) (Court held statute unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 517-19 (1973)
(Marshall, J., concurring on equal protection grounds). In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441 (1973), Justice White, concurring on equal protection grounds, stated:
[While the Court maintains that it is applying either a mere rationality or
strict scrutiny test, in fact] it must now be obvious, or has been all along, that,
as the Court's assessment of the weight and value of the individual interest es-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss1/12
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v. Kline,42 Stanley v. Illinois,43 and United States Department of Agri-
culture v. Murry.44 Alternatively, the Court could decide that the due
process clause entitled all persons similarly situated to an individual
hearing. If a statute containing an irrebuttable presumption denied a
hearing to some, the Court could hold that it violated the equal protec-
tion clause and remand it to the legislature to draw the classification
more narrowly, as it did in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur4r
and Carrington v. Rash.40  As these cases were decided, Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist noted with concern that the Court was
again47 creating unreasonable obstacles for state legislatures to regulate
state matters. 48
More recently, the Court has been reluctant to use the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine or the sliding-scale analysis to create new funda-
mental interests49 or suspect classes. 0 The Court has strictly scruti-
calates, the less likely it is that mere administrative convenience and avoidance
of hearings or investigations will be sufficient to justify what otherwise would
appear to be irrational discrimination.
Id. at 458-59.
42. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
43. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
44. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
45. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
46. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
47. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 467-68 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing): "The majority's reliance on cases such as Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312
... (1932), harks back to a day when the principles of substantive due process had
reached their zenith in this Court." (parallel citations omitted).
48. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 657 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 545 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508,
523 (1973) (Rehuquist, J., dissenting); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 460 (1973)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 99 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Note
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 652, in which he reevaluated
his initial support of the irrebuttable presumption analysis:
There is much to what MP. JUSTCE REHNQUIST [sic] says in his dissenting opin-
ion . . . about the implications of the [irrebuttable presumption] doctrine for
the tiaditional legislative power to operate by classification. As a matter of
logic, it is difficult to see the terminus of the road upon which the Court has
embarked under the banner of "irrebuttable presumptions."
49. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974). While Justice Marshall
argued in dissent that the statute incorporated an irrebuttable presumption and infringed
upon a fairly fundamental interest, requiring the Court to take a closer look at the
statute, the majority applied the mere rationality test, supplying possible reasons why
Congress might have enacted the challenged legislation. In Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U.S. 749 (1975), the statute embodied a clear irrebuttable presumption that widows who
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nized a statutory classification only when it infringed on a recognized
fundamental right or discriminated against a recognized suspect classy
In cases involving social and economic legislation the Court has deferred
to the legislature's will.52
Before 1976 courts gave only cursory attention to the constitutionality
of mandatory retirement statutes.53  In Massachusetts Board of Retire-
married less than nine months before the wage earner's death were "investor" widows
who married only to obtain death benefits. Justice Rehnquist, for the Court, ignored the
irrebuttable presumption and applied the mere rationality test to this social legislation.
See also The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REv. 47, 77 (1975). But see
Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) in which Justice Marshall
wiote a very confused opinion for the Court. He based the holding on many
'rounds: the fundamental right to travel; the "almost" fundamental basic necessities of
life; the "almost" suspectness of a classification based on wealth. While Justices Doug-
las, Blackmun, and The Chief Justice concurred only in the result, and Justice Rehnquist
dissented, it is arguable that those Justices who adhered to Justice Marshall's sliding-scale
opinion did so only on the basis of the holding in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
1969), that the right to travel was fundamental.
50. The exception here is perhaps sex. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973), a plurality opinion, the Court held that sex was a suspect class. In subsequent
cases the Court retreated from this explicit statement, but its analyses in Craig v. Boren,
97 S. Ct. 451 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975); and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), constitute a holding
that sex is a suspect class. In Barrett, supra note 3; Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitu-
tion, 44 U. CIN. L. REv,. 1 (1975); and 89 HARv. L. REv. 95 (1975), the commentators
argue that the female sex is a suspect class.
51. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (Court
refused to recognize old age as a suspect class); Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577 (1976),
(in ignoring rebuttable-in effect, irrebuttable-presumption that in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary a welfare applicant who voluntarily terminates employment 75
days or less before his application does so in order to obtain welfare benefits, the Court
applied . mere rationality test); Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423
U.S. 44 (1975) (per curiam) (pregnancy classification struck down on basis of right
to procreation upheld in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)).
52. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974). Note Justice Marshall's
dissent:
While the Court today neither expressly endorses nor rejects this approach
[two-tier analysis], its analysis is so deferential as to confirm an earlier ob-
servation that, except in cases where the Court chooses to invoke strict scru-
tiny, the Equal Protection Clause has been all but emasculated.
Id. at 431. The reemergence of the two-tier analysis is also indicated by Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 777 (1975):
The question is whether Congress, its concern having been reasonably aroused
by the poszibility of an abuse which it legitimately desired to avoid, could
rationally have concluded both that a particular limitation or qualification
would protect against its occurrence, and that the expense and other difficulties
of individual determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic
rule.
53. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Intl v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), cert.
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ment v. Murgia,5" however, the Supreme Court fully reviewed both the
equal protection and due process arguments against such statutes. The
Court reasoned that no one had a constitutional right to a government
job; hence the classification impinged on no fundamental interest." The
aged were neither a "discrete and insular" minority, nor so politically
powerless to warrant the extraordinary protection of strict judicial scruti-
ny; consequently, no suspect classification was involved." Absent these
prerequisites, the Court thought strict scrutiny inappropriate. r The
Court then applied a mere rationality test without discussing either the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine" or the prospect of any intermediate
level of review.59
Under the mere rationality test, the statute was constitutional because
it was not wholly arbitrary, nor an irrational means to achieve the
legitimate legislative purpose of a vigorous police force. In its per cu-
riam opinion,60 the Court acknowledged that mandatory retirement
denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961) (Federal Aviation Agency regulation requiring retirement at
age sixty for pilots of commercial air carriers not arbitrary, discriminatory, or without
relation to any safety requirements); Weisbrod v. Lynn, 383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974),
affd mem., 420 U.S. 940 (1975) (dismissed on basis of Mcllvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415
U.S. 986 (1974)); McIlvaine v. Pennsylvania State Police, 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801
(1973), appeal dismissed sub nom., McIlvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U.S. 986 (1974)
(mandatory retirement at age sixty for state police attacked as arbitrary and irrational;
Court summarily dismissed appeal for lack of substantial federal question). See also
Allen v. Borough of West Mifflin, 419 Pa. 394, 214 A.2d 502 (1965); Boyle v. City of
Philadelphia, 338 Pa. 129, 12 A.2d 43 (1940) (both applying mere rationality test to
mandatory retirement city ordinances); Note, Constitutional Attacks on Mandatory
Retirement: A Reconsideration, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 549 (1976); 9 CLEARINGHOUSE
REv. 311 (1975).
54. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
55. Id. at 312 n.3.
56. Id. at 312 n.4.
57. Id. at 312.
58. The irrebuttable presumption is: given the existence of Fact A (age fifty),
Fact B (physical unfitness) is presumed. The parties and amici curiae argued that the
irrebuttable presumption provided an alternative ground for invalidating the statute. See
Brief for Appellant at 33, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976); Brief for Appellee at 42; Brief for Legal Services for the Elderly Poor, American
Civil Liberties Union, The National Council of Senior Citizens and the Massachusetts
Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae at 16; Brief of State Police Ass'n of Mass. in
Support of Appellants as Amicus Curiae at 17; Brief of Lt. Carter, Capt. McGuire and
Capt. Ready in Support of Appellee as Amici Curiae at 8.
59. 427 U.S. at 314-16.
60. It is interesting to consider why this is a per curiam opinion in view of Chief
Justice Burger's and Justice Rehuquist's strident denunciations of the sliding-scale and
irrebuttable presumption doctrines and Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Cleveland
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might substantially affect an individual's psychological and economic
well-being. It also recognized that individual testing by the state might
be a more precise way of determining fitness. The Court explained,
however, that
"[w]e do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is wise, that
it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that [Massa-
chusetts] might ideally espouse, or that a more just and humane sys-
tem could not be devised.". . . We decide only that the system
enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny appellee equal
protection of the laws.f1
In dissent, Justice Marshall again pleaded for application of a sliding-
scale analysis in equal protection cases. He urged that in balancing the
right to earn a living and the degree of suspectness of the class discrimi-
nated against with the legitimate state purpose of maintaining a vigorous
police force, the means employed were so over-inclusive that they were
irrational. 62
Murgia is a clear indication that the Court is abandoning the irrebut-
table presumption analysis utilized in such cases as Dunn v. Blumstein, 8
Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 4 and Vlandis v. Kline. The
Massachusetts retirement scheme creates an irrebuttable presumption of
incapacity at age fifty; in Murgia's case that presumption was acknowl-
edged to be incorrect. Had the Court followed the reasoning of its prior
cases, the statute should have been held unconstitutional. Indeed,
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur,0 had predicted that on the basis of the majority's holding,
mandatory retirement statutes would be vulnerable to attack under an
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), indicating his general agreement with
Justice Rehnquist. One may hypothesize that Justice Stewart, author of many of the
irrebuttable presumption opinions, and Justices Brennan and White, frequent concurrers
in Justice Marshall's sliding-scale concurring and dissenting opinions, have now con-
cluded that the implications of these analyses are indeed worrisome for the whole political
system and are belatedly joining the anonymous face-saving statement of the Court in
Murgia. This hypothesis seems more likely in view of the lone dissent by Justice
Marshall.
61. 427 U.S. at 317 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)).
62. Id. at 327.
63. 405 U.S. 330 (1971).
64. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
65. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
66. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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equal protection-irrebuttable presumption analysis.67  He noted that
opponents to such statutes could argue that the liberty or fundamental
interest concepts of the due process and equal protection clauses included
the liberty to pursue freely a chosen lawful occupation and earn a
living.68 The Court's decision rejects, albeit sub silentio, these logical
implications of the prior cases. The inference is that the use of irrebut-
table presumptions as a surrogate for intermediate equal protection
review will not continue.
Murgia also reaffirms the Burger Court's rejection of the sliding scale
and emphasizes its conservative view of what constitutes a fundamental
right and a suspect classification. The mandatory retirement statute
infringes on employment, a fairly fundamental right, 0 and discriminates
on the basis of age, a fairly suspect classification.70  The Court chose
67. More closely in point is the jeopardy in which the Court's opinion places
longstanding statutes providing for mandatory retirement of government em-
ployees....
It was pointed out by my Brother Stewart only last year in his concurring
opinion in Roe v. Wade. . . that "the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment covers more than those freedoms expli-
citly named in the Bill of Rights." . . . In Truax v. Raich, the Court said:
"it requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the com-
mon occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal free-
dom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the Amendment to secure."
239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). Since this right to pursue an occupation is presum-
ably on the same lofty footing as the right of choice in matters of family life,
the Court will have to strain valiantly in order to avoid having today's opinion
lead to the invalidation of mandatory retirement statutes for governmental em-
ployees. In that event, federal, state, and local governmental bodies will be re-
mitted to the task, thankless both for them and for the employees involved,
of individual determinations of physical impairment and senility.
Id. at 659.
68. Id. Cases supporting this position include Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Truax v. Raich, 239 U,S. 33
(1915); Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888).
69. It is certainly arguable that the right to earn a living or to follow a lawful
occupation is indistinguishable from the right to vote, Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); the right to an education, Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441 (1973); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); the right to bear and
raise one's children, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Stanley v,
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); the right to the bare necessities of life, United States Dep't
of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); United States Dep't of Agriculture v.
Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
70. It is equally arguable that age is a suspect classification. Age, like those
classifications considered suspect, is determined solely by the accident of birth; it is an
immutable characteristic, bearing no relationship to the ability of the individual to
perform or contribute to society. In addition, as the Brief for Legal Services for theWashington University Open Scholarship
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not to discuss the characteristics of fundamental interests at all, and
dealt only briefly with suspectness, preferring to cite cases in which these
factors clearly existed.7' The use of the traditional mere rationality test
in Murgia is a clear signal to lower courts that suspect classifications and
fundamental interests are to be construed narrowly, and that the Court
prefers the minimal scrutiny of mere rationality.7 2
Murgia thus suggests that the Court will defer to the legislature in
matters of statutory classification. The result acknowledges that a
sliding-scale or irrebuttable presumption analysis poses the same prob-
lems for the political system as did substantive due process in an earlier
era and must be rejected for the same reasons.73 When the Court
Elderly Poor, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Council of Senior
Citizens and the Massachusetts Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae at 11, Murgia,
points out, the class of aged people meet the second indicium of suspectness by being
subjected to
a history of purposeful unequal treatment. . . . That history is perhaps not
a long time: in the 19th century and before, few people attained 65 years of
age, and those did who were productive members of society. . . . But the his-
tory of the 20th century is one of increasing prejudice and prejudicial treat-
ment, exemplified by the expansion of mandatory retirement policies and stat-
utes. Presumably, it might be suggested that one must wait for 300 years of
discrimination, such as Blacks have experienced, before the "history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment" rises to constitutional significance. To offer the
thought, however, is to reject it.
See Note, Mandatory Retirement a Vehicle for Age Discrimination, 51 CMi.-KENT L.
REV. 116 (1974); Note, Mandaioiy Retircm nt: The Law, the Courts, and the Broader
Social Context, 11 WILLAMETrE LJ. 398 (1975).
71. See notes 55 & 56 supra.
72. Although Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in Murgia, 427 U.S. at 327 n.8,
that the holding in Murgia was not dispositi- e as to all mandatory retirement statutes,
and that the validity of each statute would depend upon whether the age chosen for
forced retirement was rationally related to the state's purpose, these reservations appear
to be meaningless. Id. So long as old age and the right to work will not trigger strict
scrutiny, and the sliding-scale/irrebuttable presumption analysis is no longer viable,
mandatory retirement statutes will be judged by a mere rationality standard. With such
a quick peek, it is reasonable to assume that the Court will not find these statutes wholly
arbitrary and unreasonable.
73. Justice Powell, writing for the Court in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), pointed to the inherent flaw in the sliding-scale approach:
Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus theory are difficult
to perceive. How, for instance, is education to be distinguished from the signifi-
cant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? Empirical ex-
amination might well buttress an assumption that the rn-fed, ill-clothed, and
ill-housed are among the most ineffective participants in the political process
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the benefits of the First Amend-
ment. If so, appellees' thesis would cast serious doubt on the authority of Dan-
dridge v. Williams and Lindsey v. Normet.
Id. at 37. See discussion at note 13 supra; Yackle, supra note 9.
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strikes a statutory classification on equal protection or irrebuttable
presumption grounds, the legislature may circumvent this action by
substituting a means or classification more narrowly suited to the legiti-
mate state purpose. The task is difficult, however, and-like substan-
tive due process-usually impossible. Judicial action thus often pre-
vents the legislature from acting in the area. 4 In both instances the
Court sits as a "superlegislature" requiring near perfection from a
political system that acts in a piecemeal fashion as many interests are
accommodated.75
The Court has hinted strongly in Murgia that it will no longer employ
the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment to strike down legislation. Despite Justice Marshall's pleas, the
Court will not adopt an intermediate level of review depending upon the
interest or class infringed, the state interest involved, and the means
chosen to carry out the legitimate state purposes. Nor will it employ the
due process clause to strike down legislation on the basis of an irrebutta-
ble presumption. Instead, the Court will employ the two-tier analysis
with renewed dedication, and Murgia demonstrates that the interests
and classifications triggering strict scrutiny will be severely limited.
74. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), with Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), and Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
75. See Posner, The Defunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treat-
ment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT. Rv. 1.
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